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Abstract
This is a summary of the open discussion on IoT security and regu-
lation which took place at the Early Symmetric Crypto (ESC) seminar.
Participants have identified that IoT poses critical threat to security and
privacy. It was agreed that government regulation and dialogue of secu-
rity researchers with engineers and manufacturers is necessary in order to
find proper control mechanisms.
1 Introduction
On the last day of Early Symmetric Crypto (ESC) seminar (January, 2017) an
open discussion about Internet of Things (IoT) and lightweight cryptography
took place. It involved all the workshop participants, about 40 researchers from
academia and industry, from senior researchers to postdocs and Ph.D. students.
These notes are a summary of the main points that were raised during this
discussion.1
The discussion started with a short introduction by Prof. Adi Shamir. He
observed that the spread of the IoT is unstoppable, that such devices are already
being sold and used. For example, “smart” lightbulbs such as the Philips Hue
use the Zigbee protocol to communicate with their owners’ smartphones. Other
home appliances are already being connected to the internet: fridges, TVs,
washing machines... And applications to other areas are expected, from the
supply chain to public transport.
This trend cannot be stopped and will only accelerate in the foreseeable
future. Meanwhile, there have been major attacks against network-enabled
“things”. For example, shodan is a search engine indexing various devices con-
nected to Internet (web cams, control systems, servers, etc.), which can then be
used to find vulnerable ones. There have also been ransomware attacks target-
ing the owners of “smart” TVs. Such threats are likely to occur more frequently
in the future. In the light of these observations, this discussion tried to address
the following question:
What should be done about the IoT security?
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1The points raised by the participants are not sorted chronologically but by theme.
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Adi Shamir has asked the participants to vote on whether they thought
involving governments was necessary. A majority has agreed. What form should
this intervention take? The following ideas were suggested by the participants.
They can be sorted into four broad categories: the first deals with devices’
update mechanisms, the second with liability issues, the third with the influence
of specific properties of the devices (i.e. with a partition of the IoT space), and
the last considers separating real world from cyber functionalities.
2 Update Mechanisms
Current status-quo in the industry seems to be that firmware needs to be updat-
able so that vulnerabilities found after the launch of a product can be patched.
However, firmware updates also open the doors to attacks exploiting the up-
date mechanism itself. This very dangerous attack vector would be disabled in
the absence of updates. If functionality of a device is well-defined, and if the
firmware has been thoroughly tested, it may well be acceptable to make firmware
not updatable. To give a real-world example: the firmware of smart cards in the
payment industry was for a long period not updatable. In cases where update
mechanism is inevitable there also should be a way to force manufacturers to
update their firmware in the cases of disasters. There may also be issues related
to companies disappearing from the market, while their potentially vulnerable
products are still in wide use – how should these be updated? In fact, Germany
considers forcing the storage of the source code in some trusted institution so
that if the company disappears, it is possible to fix the problem anyway.
On the technical side, should we force the use of public key crypto to secure
firmware update? After all, the attack against the Philipps HUE smart light-
bulb was made possible by a misplaced use of symmetric cryptography. Using
public key crypto would simplify key management: instead of using a hard to
protect symmetric key, a public key would be used instead. While public key
cryptography is far more demanding in terms of resources, updates are not
expected to be common enough for this to be a significant issue.
When it comes to implementing sophisticated update mechanisms, another
problem is that less secure devices will probably be cheaper than secure ones.
3 Liability
In case of a problem with an IoT device, who is responsible for fixing it? There
are different ways to approach this question.
It could be possible to fine customers if they use/keep using insecure devices.
There is no precedent we are aware of for such measures2. For example, no such
thing exists for PC owners. It would also be hard to enforce .
Some form of insurance against malfunctions could be made mandatory. In
this case, the cost of refunding customers could be solved by factoring this cost
into the product prices.
If a product is insecure because of a gross negligence from its manufacturer,
said manufacturer should be liable. However, this would imply differentiating
2Note that in some countries (ex. Italy) it is illegal to use police radio scanners, as another
example Doppler receivers (to detect speed cameras) tend to be outlawed in Europe
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gross negligence from “honest” mistakes. For example, having a default pass-
word in a multitude of devices could be considered gross negligence.
Some devices can obviously be regulated (e.g. medical devices, see American
FDA) but they only represent a tiny fraction of all devices. What about self-
driven cars? There is currently a substantial debate about liability in this case.
After an accident, who is liable? The driver? The car manufacturer? The
programmer? It seems like those involved are converging towards having the
car manufacturer to be liable.
Connection of millions of identical devices to public resources like Internet
should probably be tightly regulated in a way similar to radio spectrum regula-
tion, since the consequences of abuse of such devices by attackers are comparable
to jamming the public resource.
For short life-cycle disposable items it could be that part of the price paid
by the consumer for the device is retained in a common disaster recovery fund
and released to the manufacturer only at the end of the lifetime of the device, if
no disaster has happened. In the case of a security disaster, cost of recovery is
reduced from the fund. This model is reminiscent of how copyright is factored
into the cost of media via government levy (tax). This model might not be
feasible without government regulation.
Finally, computer security could be considered like a common property. The
legislative framework handling e.g. pollution could be adapted, so that a com-
pany releasing an insecure device is responsible for handling the consequences.
Similarly, a user connecting a device known to be insecure to a network would
be liable for the problems caused.
4 Influence of Devices’ Specifics
It may be beneficial – or even necessary – to consider different classes of devices.
Instead of fitting all IoT devices into a single legislative framework, it may be
better to treat them differently depending on their specifics.
For example, we could sort devices according to the danger posed by a
security breach. Getting access to a pacemaker is far more dangerous than
accessing a smart curtain. On the other hand, estimating how dangerous a
breach is can be difficult. Hacking into a smart light-bulb may seem harmless
but it can allow the remote infection of other similar products and then using
those to effectively jam wifi signal across a large area. We could separate devices
according to the networking abilities: if it is not connected to the Internet, it
cannot do too much harm. Similarly, if it is connected but has a very low
bandwidth, a security breach may not be very dangerous.
5 Clear Separation Between Cyber and Physical
Worlds
Security measures could be implemented physically into some devices, like the
floppy disks in the past which could be taped to make them read-only guarantee-
ing that no malware could infect them. For example, there could be a physical
switch separating between smart/dumb functionality or, in general, between
physical and cyber capabilities of the device. Similarly, in a smart-car, there
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should be a physical separation between the car entertainment system (which is
connected to the Internet) and the main car functionality. Since we live in the
physical world, there is no need for the cyber to be in complete control of our
lives. However, this most likely needs to be enforced by regulation.
Devices could also be given a limited shelf life after which they must be
discarded. This last option would unfortunately have an environmental cost. In
fact, stimulative regulation might be sufficient. Devices could be simply labelled
to specify e.g. whether they require a permanent Internet connection, whether
they use it only for updates, whether they send data to a central server, etc.
6 Concluding Remarks
The approaches outlined above share common limitations. First of all, laws
would need to be approved in a lot of independent countries in order for them
to be efficient. We also need to keep the danger of surveillance in mind. For
example, smart-meters for electricity pose a significant privacy threat which is
not addressed by the points raised above. Besides, government involvement may
backfire if the laws adopted are not carefully thought through.
How could cryptographers help? We could create/participate in forums
and public discussions, communicating with engineers and manufacturers. We
could write white papers with security recommendations and systematization
of knowledge (SoK) papers.
Having forums gathering manufacturers, governments and academics to dis-
cuss these matters would be welcome. Those that currently exist are usually
organised by manufacturers, whose incentive is to sell more products, while
privacy and security are just added costs and overheads. While ISO/IEC is
exploring IoT standardization, security and privacy are low on their priority
list.
At the end of the debates, participants agreed that:
• the IoT is unstoppable,
• some regulation is needed,
• a major security risk (but not the only one) is the firmware update chain.
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